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Abstract The goal of the paper is to try to account for an interesting binding
phenomenon, namely the fact that pronouns sometimes appear to be bound by
universal quantifiers out of islands. Specifically, my claim is that the appearance
of binding is an illusion which results from the fact that pronouns can stand for
universal quantifiers, i.e. there is a new type of pronouns of laziness. However, the
distribution of such pronouns of laziness is highly restricted. These restrictions can
be derived by means of Maximize Presupposition principle and situation semantics.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 1, I illustrate the phenomenon. In
section 2, I show that this phenomenon is not a case of real binding but a binding
illusion which is made possible by the fact that pronouns can stand for universal
quantifiers like everyone. In sections 3 and 4, I show that there are certain restrictions
on the environments in which such a binding illusion is possible. First, it is ruled
out in cases where it is in conflict with Maximize Presupposition principle (section
3). Second, it is only possible when the clause containing a quantifier and the clause
containing a pronoun in a sense describe the same situation (section 4). In section 5,
two readings of illusive binding sentences are discussed and an analysis of how they
are derived is proposed. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Keywords: pronominal binding, conditionals, pronouns of laziness, universal quantifiers,
situation semantics, illusive scope, Maximize Presupposition
1 The problem: exceptional binding
Sometimes a universal quantifier seems to be able to bind a pronoun out of an
embedded clause as is illustrated by the following example from Russian in (1)1:
∗Many thanks to Danny Fox, Irene Heim, Kai von Fintel and the audience of SALT 20 in Vancouver.
All errors are mine.
1 Examples of “exceptional binding” in this work come from Russian, although it is more than likely
that similar phenomena are attested in other languages as well.
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(1) Esli
if
každyji
everyone
budet
will
zanimat’sja
do
svoim
his.own
delom,
business
oni
he
prineset
will.bring
bol’še
more
pol’zy.
use
‘(?)If everyonei minds his own business, hei will be more useful.’
The fact that binding is possible in this configuration is quite puzzling. It has often
been argued in the literature that the necessary condition on binding is a c-command
requirement (cf. Reinhart 1983) which was hotly debated for decades but recently
defended against apparent counterexamples by Büring’s (2004) situation semantic
approach. In (1), the quantifier, obviously, doesn’t c-command the pronoun. But
even if we assume that the surface c-command requirement is not the one that
determines the possibility of binding, it is still not clear how the quantifier can bind
the pronoun, as the pronoun is not in the scope of the quantifier (if we believe that
QR is clause-bound). So sentences like (1) seem to be a problem for any existing
semantic theory of variable binding.
Moreover, the situation seems to be even more complicated than that, as binding
out of an embedded clause is not an option that is always available, as (2) shows:
(2) *Esli
if
každyji
everyone
poluchil
got
podarok,
present
oni
he
byl
was
rad.
glad
Intended: ‘(*)If everyonei got a present, hei was glad.’
The question arises as to what the source of exceptional binding in cases like (1) is
and what are the environments in which such binding is possible.
The main claim I argue for in this paper is that in cases like (1), a pronoun is not
truly a bound variable, rather it stands for a universally quantified NP, thus creating
the illusion of binding.
2 What is the source of binding?
The goal of this section is to find out what the source of binding in cases like (1) is.
In subsection 2.1, I will test whether QR can be responsible for these exceptional
binding cases. In subsection 2.2, the situation binding approach à la Fox & Sauerland
(1997) will be examined. In subsection 2.3, I will sketch an alternative analysis.
2.1 Quantifier raising?
The first obvious possible answer to the question of what the source of binding
in cases like (1) is could be Quantifier Raising (I am not concerned whether it is
literally QR or some other mechanism which is responsible for a quantifier getting
721
Natalia Ivlieva
wide scope). Let’s test this hypothesis.
First of all, it should be noted that QR is commonly assumed to be clause-bound,
which should prevent the quantifier every from taking scope over the matrix sentence.
But let’s assume for a second that the quantifier can undergo QR out of the if-clause,
which results in the following LF:
(3) ∀x. if x minds x’s own business, x will be more useful
If it was indeed a legitimate movement, we wouldn’t have any problems at all, since,
as it seems, the LF in (3) correctly captures the truth conditions of (1). However,
this line of analysis cannot be maintained even if we were willing to relax our
assumptions about the locality of QR because of the puzzle described below.
Let’s consider the following situation:
(4) There are two brothers, Sam and Jeremy, and two sisters, Mary and Claire.
Sam and Jeremy are marrying Mary and Claire.
In this scenario, the sentence (5) is grammatical and is interpreted as entailing that
Sam and Jeremy are becoming each others’ brothers-in-law.
(5) Esli
if
by
would
každyji
every
iz
of
nix
them
ženilsja
marry
na
on
odnoj
one
iz
of
sester,
sisters
egoi
his
brat
brother
stal
become
by
would
egoi
his
svojakom.
brother-in-law
‘If [each of them]i married one of the sisters, hisi brother would become hisi
brother-in-law.’
Let’s suppose that (5) has the LF in (6):
(6) ∀x. if x marries one of the sisters, x’s brother will become x’s brother-in-law.
Now consider the situation in which Sam marries Mary, but Jeremy doesn’t marry
Claire. Then, if (6) was indeed an allowed representation of (5), the sentence would
be predicted to entail that Sam’s brother (Jeremy) becomes his brother-in-law. The
prediction, however, is not borne out. In fact, we do not interpret (5) as entailing
that Jeremy becomes Sam’s brother-in-law in this scenario, as for two brothers to
become brothers-in-law they both must marry two sisters (it is not enough for one of
them to marry one of the sisters).
Thus, analyzing this case leads us to the conclusion that the binding interpretation
cannot be the result of a quantifier taking wide scope outside of an if -clause.
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2.2 Trivialization of a universal quantifier by a generic operator?
The other option would be to say that binding in (1) is merely an illusion, the crucial
mechanism for getting the interpretation being situation binding as proposed in Fox
& Sauerland 1997 for universal quantifiers in generic contexts in English.
Fox and Sauerland note that in generic contexts QR of universal quantifiers may
seem to violate clause-boundedness or obviate WCO effect, cf. example in (7).
(7) Heri thesis year is the hardest for [every student]i.
The grammaticality of (7) shows that the effect of WCO is somehow obviated2.
Fox and Sauerland argue that this unexpectedly large scope of the universal
quantifier is due to the presence of the generic operator and not to QR. The pronoun in
this case is interpreted as an e-type pronoun, namely a definite description dependent
on the situation that the generic operator quantifies over. The interpretation they
propose for (7) is as in (8):
(8) For every relevant situation s, [the student in s]’s thesis year is the hardest
for every student in s
The meaning of the QNP every student in (8) can be trivialized – its domain could
be restricted to just one individual in each of the situations the generic operator
quantifies over. That is what makes the illusion of binding.
Let’s assume that in cases like (5) binding is "illusive" in the sense of Fox &
Sauerland 1997. The semantics for (5) will then be as in (9):
(9) For every relevant situation s in which [every brother in s] marries one of the
sisters, [the brother in s]’s brother becomes [the brother in s]’s brother-in-law.
However, we are facing the same problem again: the predicted truth conditions are
too strong. In the situation where Sam marries Mary and Jeremy doesn’t marry
Claire, it would be predicted that Jeremy and Sam become brothers-in-law, but this
prediction is not borne out, as was already discussed in the previous subsection.
2.3 A sketch of the proposal: pronouns as hidden universals
In the two preceding subsections, I presented some evidence for the fact that the
binding interpretation in sentences like (1) is due neither to QR nor to the generic
operator. The proposal I will argue for is that it is due to the fact that a pronoun
stands for a universal quantifier.
2 Fox and Sauerland, however, do not say anything about the ungrammaticality of sentences like *Hisi
mother loves every childi that could also be treated as generic statements.
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Note that if we assume that a pronoun stands for a universal quantifier, we can
capture the truth conditions of (5) correctly. Consider the possible LF of (5):
(10) If [each of the two brothers] marries one of the sisters, [each of the two
brothers] λx. x’s brother becomes x’s brother-in-law.
If so, the binding interpretation in cases like (5) is not the result of real binding, but
it is just a binding illusion.
The question I will be concerned with in the next section is what are conditions
under which this binding illusion is possible. In particular, in case of conditionals,
the question is what the semantics of a conditional must be.
The claim I will argue for is that only a particular type of conditionals, namely
one-case conditionals in the sense of Kadmon 1987, allow for such a binding illusion.
I will attempt to derive this restriction from the principle of Maximize Presupposition.
3 What is the semantics of an “exceptional binding” conditional?
It is generally assumed that if -clauses serve as restrictors of different operators, cf.
Kratzer 1987 and others. They can restrict a covert adverb of quantification as in
(11) or a covert modal as in (12). Kadmon (1987) terms the readings exemplified in
(11) and (12) multi-case and one-case interpretation, respectively:
(11) (ALWAYS) If John stays late at work, he has no dinner.
(12) (MUST) If John’s light is on now, he is at home.
The sentences in (11) and (12) can be given the following paraphrases, respectively:
(13) ‘Whenever John stays late at work, he has no dinner.’
(14) ‘If it’s true that John’s light is on now, then he is at home.’
The rough semantics we adopt for multi-case and one-case conditionals is given in
(15) and (16):
(15) Every situation in which John stays late at work is a situation in which he
has no dinner.
(16) In all the worlds compatible with our knowledge in which John’s light is
on, he is at home.
The difference between the two types of conditionals is that there is quantification
over situations within the same world in the case of (11), whereas there is quantifi-
cation over possible worlds associated with the modal but no quantification over
situations within one world in the case of (12).
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In what follows, I will give some evidence in favor of the hypothesis that the
"exceptional binding" conditional must have “one-case” semantics and try to give an
explanation for that fact.
3.1 Aspect and one-case vs. multi-case interpretation
It has often been claimed that perfective sentences express an episodic event, whereas
imperfective sentences can report a generalization (see Bonomi 1997 and Menendez-
Benito 1983, i.a, for Italian and Spanish). This seems to be true for Russian as
well. As shown below, unlike imperfective sentences, perfective sentences are
incompatible with always-type adverbs which can serve as evidence for the fact that
perfective sentences cannot have a multi-case interpretation.
(17) Kogda
when
Džon
John
prixodil
came.IPF
domoj,
home
on
he
vsegda
always
pil
drank.IPF
cˇaj.
tea
‘When John came home, he always drank tea.’
(18) *Kogda
when
Džon
John
prišel
came.PF
domoj,
home
on
he
vsegda
always
pil
drank.IPF
cˇaj.
tea
The same holds for conditionals:
(19) Esli
if
Džon
John
budet
will
prixodit’
come.IPF
domoj
home
rano,
early
on
he
budet
will
každyj
every
raz
time
gotovit’
cook
užin.
dinner
‘If John comes home early, he will cook dinner every time (he does so).’
(20) *Esli
if
Džon
John
pridet
come.PF
domoj
home
rano,
early
on
he
budet
will
každyj
every
raz
time
gotovit’
cook
užin.
dinner
The imperfective conditional (19) can be paraphrased as follows: whenever John
comes home early, he will cook dinner. The perfective conditional (20), on the
other hand, is incompatible with the quantificational adverbial ’every time’, as the
ungrammaticality of (20) shows.
Taking into consideration the facts discussed above, we can conclude that per-
fective aspect blocks generic (multi-case) interpretation.
An obvious way of deriving this generalization is to assume that perfective
if -clauses cannot serve as restrictors to adverbs of quantification3.
To implement this idea technically, we can adopt the analysis of the perfec-
tive/imperfective aspect along the lines of Hacquard 2006. The perfective aspect
3 I assume that the semantics of always is equivalent to the semantics of the generic operator: both
introduce universal quantification over situations.
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is associated with existential quantification over events and its semantics looks as
follows:
(21) JPERFECTIVEK= λP〈s,t〉.λ t.∃e [τ (e)⊆ t ∧P(e)]4
The imperfective morpheme, in its turn, doesn’t have any semantic import by itself.
It is just a default morpheme which appears in the environments in which perfective
cannot.
Thus, the difference between perfective and imperfective if -clauses can be
described as follows. Perfective aspectual operator closes existentially the situation
variable, thus making the if -clause not able to restrict the adverb. The imperfective
morpheme, on the contrary, doesn’t do anything by itself, so the imperfective if -
clause can perfectly restrict the generic operator.
Crucially, the sentence (5) is perfective, which nicely demonstrates that sentences
that allow exceptional binding do not need to be multi-case conditionals.
In the next subsection, I will try to show that sentences that allow exceptional
binding not only do not need but in fact cannot be multi-case conditionals.
3.2 Multi-case conditionals and binding
It seems that binding illusion is ruled out in all the cases of multi-case conditionals.
Consider a multi-case conditional (22):
(22) *Esli
if
každyji
every
cˇelovek
person
sažaet
plants.IPF
derevo,
tree
oni
he
prinosit
brings.IPF
pol’zu
use
planete.
to.planet
Intended: ‘If everyone plants a tree, he helps the planet.’
Compare this with grammatical (23). (23) contains perfective aspect, which serves
as evidence that this is a one-case conditional:
(23) Esli
If
každyji
every
cˇelovek
person
posadit
plants.PF
derevo,
tree
oni
he
prineset
brings.PF
pol’zu
use
planete.
to.planet
‘If every person plants a tree, he will help the planet.’
The question arises as to what exactly blocks binding in case of multi-case condi-
tionals.
4 According to this definition, the perfective operator takes a predicate of events and a time argument
and returns truth iff the time of the event is contained within the reference time. (For the purposes
of the present work, it doesn’t matter whether there is a conceptual difference between events and
situations, I treat them the same.)
726
Universal laziness of pronouns
3.3 Exceptional binding and Maximize Presupposition
As was shown in the previous subsection, binding is impossible in multi-case
conditionals. In this subsection, I will try to give a possible solution to the question
of why this is so.
Note that if the universally quantified NP is replaced with an indefinite NP in
(22), the sentence becomes good (we get a typical donkey sentence).
(24) Esli
If
cˇeloveki
person
sažaet
plants.IPF
derevja,
trees
oni
he
prinosit
brings.IPF
pol’zu
use
planete.
to.planet
‘If a person plants a tree, he helps the planet.’
What explains the contrast between (22) and (24)? We can assume that in generic
(multi-case) sentences, there is a competition between a universally quantified NP
and an indefinite NP for expressing binding interpretation. It was argued that in
donkey sentences, quantification is over minimal situations. Thus, we can assume
that an indefinite NP is preferred over every-NP due to the Maximize Presupposition
principle, which requires that the expression with the strongest presupposition be
used, cf. Heim 1997. The article a in English and corresponding bare NP in Russian
have the uniqueness presupposition in generic sentences, cf. Percus 1997, unlike
every which doesn’t have such a presupposition, so by this principle an indefinite
NP must be used.
As for non-generic sentences, there is no such competition between an indefinite
NP and a universally quantified NP, since in this case there is nothing that can give a
universal force to an indefinite NP (in case of generic conditionals, it was an adverb
quantification ( = generic operator) which was the source of the quantificational
force). Based on the evidence given above, we can conclude that sentences such
as (1) cannot be generic sentences quantifying over minimal situations, and excep-
tional binding is possible only in one-case conditionals. Taking into account this
generalization, let’s modify our LF for (5):
(25) ONE-CASE CONDITIONAL LF, first take
(In all the worlds compatible with what is known)5, if ∃s1.each of the
brothers marries one of the sisters in s1, ∃s2. [each of the brothers] λx. x’s
brother would become x’s brother-in-law in s2.
In the next section, I will show that this LF must be modified a little bit more.
5 From now on I will omit this part of the LF, since it is not relevant for the present discussion.
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4 One more constraint on exceptional binding
In the previous section, I showed that exceptional binding is ruled out in multi-case
conditionals. However, having one-case conditional semantics is not enough for
binding to be possible. Consider the contrast between the (a) and (b) sentences in
(26)-(29):
(26) a. Esli každyji budet dumat’ tol’ko o sebe, egoi žizn’ stanet nicˇtožnoj.
Literally: ‘If everyonei will think only about himself, hisi life will
become miserable.’
b. *Esli každyji budet dumat’ tol’ko o sebe, egoi uvoljat.
Intended:‘If everyonei will think only about himself, hei will be fired.’
(27) a. Esli každyji napišet stat’ju o vrede kurenija, oni pomožet spasti žizni
millionov.
Literally: ‘If everyonei writes a paper on the harm of smoking, hei will
help to save the lives of millions.’
b. *Esli každyji napišet stat’ju o vrede kurenija, oni polucˇit priz.
Intended: ‘If everyonei writes a paper on the harm of smoking, hei will
get a prize.’
(28) a. Esli každyj biznesmeni vložit den’gi v stroitel’stvo školy, oni sdelaet
dobroe delo.
Literally: ‘If every businessmani gives some money for the school
construction, hei will be doing a good thing.’
b. *Esli každyj biznesmeni vložit den’gi v stroitel’stvo školy, oni polucˇit
nagradu ot prezidenta.
Intended: ‘If every businessmani gives some money for the school
construction, hei will be given a president award.’
(29) a. Esli každyji zajmetsja svoim delom, oni prineset bol’she pol’zy.
‘(*)If everyonei starts doing his own business, hei will become more
useful.’
b. *Esli každyji zajmetsja svoim delom, oni v skorom vremeni polucˇit
povyšenie.
Intended: ‘If everyonei does his own business, hei will be soon pro-
moted.’
As can be seen from the examples above, all the (a)-sentences are good, whereas
(b)-sentences are ungrammatical. It should be noted that the only difference between
the (a) and (b) sentences is the consequent clause (the antecedent clause is the same).
The question that arises is what is this relation between the antecedent and the
consequent that affects the possibility of binding and what it tells us about.
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It turned out to be a difficult task to define what exactly the semantic difference
between the (a) and (b) sentences is. An interesting observation, however, is that
the sentences that allow binding also allow for modification with the adverbial tem
samym, literally: ‘by that itself’ (a rough English equivalent would be a paraphrase
with a by-gerund) of the form shown in (30):
(30) Esli každyji zajmetsja svoim delom, oni tem samym prineset bol’she pol’zy.
‘By starting doing his own business, one will become more useful.’
(Literally:‘If everyonei starts doing his own business, by that itself hei will
bring more use.’)
Intuitively, what the possibility of modification with tem samym is telling us is that
the situations expressed by the antecedent and the consequent clauses are in fact
the same situation, only with different names. When the situations are different and
the conditional sentence in fact expresses the relation that holds between them (for
example, it could be a causal relation), such modification becomes impossible, cf.
(a)-sentences (same situation) and (b)-sentences (different situations) in (31) and
(32).
(31) a. Esli
if
cˇeloveki
person
dumaet
thinks
tol’ko
only
o
about
sebe,
self
oni
he
tem
by.that
samym
by.itself
otravljaet
poisons
sebe
to.self
žizn’.
life
‘By thinking only about himself, one makes his life miserable.’
b. Esli
if
cˇeloveki
person
dumaet
thinks
tol’ko
only
o
about
sebe,
self
egoi
him
*(tem
by.that
samym)
by.itself
uvol’njajut.
fire
‘(*)By thinking only about himself, one is fired.’
(32) a. Esli
if
biznesmeni
businessman
vkladyvaet
invest
den’gi
money
v
in
stroitel’stvo
construction
škol,
of.schools
oni
he
tem
by.that
samym
by.itself
delaet
does
dobroe
good
delo.
deed
‘By giving money for school construction, a businessman will be doing
a good thing.’
b. *Esli
if
biznesmeni
businessman
vkladyvaet
invests
den’gi
money
v
in
stroitel’stvo
construction
škol,
of.schools
oni
he
tem
by.that
samym
by.itself
polucˇaet
gets
nagradu
award
ot
from
prezidenta.
president
‘(*)By giving money for school construction, a businessman is awarded
by the President.’
729
Natalia Ivlieva
The question now is how to implement this intuition technically. To try to do it, let’s
return to Russian and look again at the LF in (25), repeated in (33):
(33) if ∃s1.each of the brothers marries one of the sisters in s1, ∃s2. [each of the
brothers] λx. x’s brother would become x’s brother-in-law in s2.
How can we guarantee that s1 and s2 be the same situation? It’s not such a trivial
task, as the situation variable of the consequent clause cannot be bound by the
existential quantifier which is inside the if -clause.
At the moment, I am not ready to provide any good solution to this problem.
The only thing I would like to point here is that it is possible to imagine how it can
be done within a dynamic binding approach, as pointed out to me by I. Heim (p.c.)6.
Roughly speaking, within this approach, the semantics of a conditional “if p,
then q” is equivalent to “if p, then p and q” and thus the variable contained in the
consequent clause q can be bound by a quantifier from the antecedent clause p. Then
to represent the idea that the antecedent and the consequent are part of one and the
same situation, the LF given in (33) should be modified in the following way:
(34) ONE-CASE CONDITIONAL LF, second take
if ∃s1.each of the brothers marries one of the sisters in s1, ∃s2.each of the
brothers marries one of the sisters in s2 and [each of the brothers] λx. x’s
brother would become x’s brother-in-law in s2
5 Further observations
5.1 Two readings of “exceptional binding” sentences
Now I would like to come back to the fact that sentences allowing binding such as
(1), repeated as (35), can also have a stronger reading.
(35) Esli každyji budet zanimat’sja svoim delom, oni prineset bol’še pol’zy.
‘If everyonei does his job, hei will be more useful.’
To show that, consider the following scenario:
(36) There are four people: Peter, John, Michael and Sam. Peter and John are
doing their job, Michael and Sam are not.
Under such scenario, the sentence (35) entails that Peter and John are being more
useful. However, the analysis developed so far doesn’t predict this. The LF for (35)
is given in (37):
6 For the details of the dynamic binding approach I direct the reader to Chierchia 1995.
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(37) if ∃s1.everyone is doing his job in s1, ∃s2.everyone is doing his job in s2
and everyone will be more useful in s2.
According to the LF in (37), the entailment that John and Peter are being more useful
is predicted to be falsified by the scenario sketched above, but in fact, as we just
said, it is not.
5.2 Accounting for both readings7
It is commonly assumed that quantifier domains are contextually restricted. For
example, when we say “Every student is writing a composition”, it is evident that we
refer not to every student in the world, but to some restricted domain, for example,
we can mean every student in the class. Sometimes this domain restriction is overtly
expressed as in (38):
(38) Everyone in this room is sleeping.
In the literature, there were attempts to use Austinian topic situations (situations the
assertions are about) to account for the implicit quantifier restrictions, cf. Kratzer
2009 and references therein.
But it has been convincingly argued by Soames (1985) that quantifier domains
are not necessarily provided by topic situations. To demonstrate that, Soames gave
the following example:
(39) Everyone is asleep and is being monitored by a research assistant (in a Sleep
Lab).
If the domain of everyone were provided by a single topic situation, this utterance
would have been contradictory, since then it would be understood that the research
assistants are also asleep.
This paradox is resolved by stating that the implicit quantifier restriction comes
not from the topic situation, but from another, contextually salient “resource situa-
tion” (in case of (39), this situation doesn’t include research assistants).
I will adopt the idea that a quantifier contains a situation variable which can get
its value from the context. In such a way, the weaker reading of the sentences like
(1)/(35) can be accounted for. The weaker reading of (1) will be the following:
(40) if ∃s1.[everyone in s] is doing his job in s1,
∃s2.[everyone in s] is doing his job in s2 and [everyone in s] will be more
useful in s2
(where s is a “resource situation”)
7 I owe many ideas in this subsection to I. Heim (p.c.).
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Crucially, we have to assume that this situation variable has the option of being
locally bound giving rise to the LF shown in (41). In such a way, the stronger reading
of (1) is captured:
(41) if ∃s1.[everyone in s1] is doing his job in s1,
∃s2.[everyone in s2] is doing his job in s2 and [everyone in s2] will be more
useful in s2
Let’s see how exactly this LF generates the stronger reading. Consider again the
scenario below (same as (36)):
(42) There are four people: Peter, John, Michael and Sam. Peter and John are
doing their job, Michael and Sam are not.
Under this scenario, the sentence entails that Peter and John are being useful. Do we
predict this with the LF in (41)? In this case, the situation in which Peter and John
are doing their business can be picked as a situation s1. Thus the LF in (41) says that
everyone in that situation, namely Peter and John, are being more useful, which is
correct.
I assume that sentences like (1) are ambiguous. They can have both LFs which
accounts for the two readings. But sometimes the context can make the sentence
false under one of the readings, thus forcing the other reading, as was the case with
the sentence (5). The same holds for the following sentence.
(43) Esli by každyj biznesmeni vložil den’gi v stroitel’stvo školy, oni by ne
obednel, a milliony šhkol byli by postroeny.
Literally: ‘If every businessmani gave some money for school construction,
hei wouldn’t become poorer but millions of schools would be constructed.’
The context dictates that only the weaker reading is available, as we know that for
millions of schools to be constructed it is necessary that a lot of businessmen invest
money into it.
5.3 The relevant configuration of a quantifier and a pronoun
One more question that needs to be answered is why the sentence (44) cannot have
the meaning shown in (45).
(44) Every boy likes his father.
(45) Every boy likes every boy’s father.
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Descriptively, it looks like the necessary requirement for a pronoun to be able to
stand for a universal quantifier is the following: in order to be interpreted as a
universal quantifier, a pronoun must be outside of the quantifier scope.
I will leave the explanation of why this is so for further research.
6 Conclusion
To conclude, let me briefly repeat several main points I’ve made in the paper:
i. Pronouns sometimes seem to be bound by universal quantifiers outside of
islands, which is a problematic fact for existing theories of variable binding.
ii. However, this is not a real binding, but a binding illusion which is created by
the fact that pronouns can stand for universal quantifiers. Thus there exists a
new type of pronouns of laziness.
iii. There are specific constraints on the environments in which pronouns can
stand for universal quantifiers. Some of these constraints can be accounted
for with the help of the Maximize Presupposition principle and situation
semantics. Others are not yet very well understood and require some further
investigation.
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